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COMMENTS
complete service at a lower cost. It has been noted that such a
"package service" would be especially valuable to the small busi-
nessman who may not be able to engage an attorney and a CPA
separately.58 However, considering the conflict of duties prob-
lem, it must be recommended that joint practice be limited only
by prohibiting the joint practitioner's certifying financial state-
ments and acting as an attorney for the same client. On the other
hand, the reasons which have been advanced in support of pro-
hibiting any type of joint practice do not seem to apply to situa-
tions where the attorney-CPA, in addition to acting in the capac-
ity of an attorney, counsels his client in accounting problems not
requiring certification.
The stringent prohibitions expressed in this proposed Code
would undoubtedly have the effect of deterring capable individ-
uals from attempting to achieve professional proficiency in both
accountancy and law. To discourage such attempts would be ob-
viously detrimental to both professions, and more important, to
the public, for although unlimited concurrent practice of law and
accounting may be inadvisable, the individual practitioner will
inevitably apply, to the public good, his knowledge of one dis-
cipline in his practice of the other.
Rather than follow the negative and prohibitory approach of
the proposed Code, it would seem better to encourage the develop-
ment of greater individual proficiency in both professions to the
end that the public may receive the benefit of more efficient and
complete counsel in those areas of the law involving virtually
inseparable questions of law and accounting. To achieve this end,
Canon 27 of the ABA's Canons of Professional Ethics and the
related rules of the rvarious state bar associations should be
amended to permit the attorney-CPA to designate himself as
"attorney-certified public accountant" and to state openly his
dual professional qualifications on cards, letterheads, shingles,
doors, building directories, and announcements.
Charles B. Sklar
Appellate Review on the Facts in a Criminal Case
HOW MUCH EVIDENCE IS "SOME" EVIDENCE
Article VII, Section 10, of the Louisiana Constitution pro-
vides that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in criminal
58. Comment, 3 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 360, 369 (1956).
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cases shall extend "to questions of law alone."' It is implicit in
this provision that the court shall have no power to review facts
in criminal cases. 2 It is inevitable, however, that questions of
law do not arise in a vacuum void of facts.3 To interpret the con-
stitutional provision as restricting the court's power of review to
questions of "pure law"'4 would emasculate the utility of appel-
late review. Recognizing this, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
interpreted the constitutional provision so as to allow, in effect,
a review or "examination" 5 of the facts in a criminal case in cer-
tain limited instances. Thus although questions of fact passed
on by the jury are generally beyond review,6 'where the trial
judge himself passes on mixed questions of law and fact 7 or on
1. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
2. See State v. Di Vincenti, 232 La. 13, 93 So.2d 676 (1957) ; State v. Gaspard,
222 La. 222, 62 So.2d 281 (1952) ; State v. Haddad, 221 La. 337, 59 So.2d 411
(1952) ; State v. Smith, 153 La. 245, 95 So. 705 (1923) ; State v. Green, 111 La.
89, 35 So. 396 (1903).
3. See State v. Charlot, 8 Rob. 529, 530 (La. 1844) : "Questions of law are so
frequently dependent upon the testimony, and so mingled with the facts, that it
would, in many instances, be difficult to disconnect them. What would be a cor-
rect exercise of the legal discretion of the court, upon one set of facts, would, on
a different hypothesis, where the mass of testimony was of a contrary and different
complexion, constitute such a perversion of its legal discretion, as imperiously to
require the intervention of this court."
4. There is some authority to the effect that the curious wording of the Con-
stitution using the word "alone" restricts the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
questions of pure law. See the dissent of Justice Fenner in State v. Seiley, 41 La.
Ann. 143, 153 (1889) : "Prior to the Constitution of 1845, there was no constitu-
tional provision regulating appeals in criminal cases. Under the legislative pro-
visions on that subject, the court of criminal appeals had assumed jurisdiction to
pass on questions of fact when blended with questions of law. To put an end to
this practice, the Constitution of 1845 expressly and emphatically restricted the
appellate jurisdiction to 'questions of law alone.' " But cf. State v. Nelson, 32 La.
Ann. 842, 844 (1880) : "It unquestionably was the object of the framers of the
different constitutions of this State, which limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in the criminal cases specified to questions of law alone, that such court
should not have the power of reviewing the facts proved on the trial of the case
and passed upon by the jury . . . in other words, of reviewing the verdict of the
jury."
5. See State v. Thomas, 224 La. 431, 69 So.2d 738 (1954) (examine) ; State v.
D'Ingianni, 217 La. 945, 47 So.2d 731 (1950) (investigate) ; State v. Drew, 202
La. 8, 11 So.2d 12 (1942) (examine).
6. State v. Hilliard, 227 La. 208, 78 So.2d 835 (1955) ; State v. Green, 111 La.
89, 35 So. 396 (1903).
7. See State v. Domino, 234 La. 950, 102 So.2d 227 (1958) (admissibility of
confessions) ; State v. Baum, 230 La. 247, 88 So.2d 209 (1956) (competency of
experts) ; State v. Magee, 215 La. 675, 41 So.2d 499 (1949) (commission of overt
act by deceased) ; State v. Brodes, 156 La. 428, 100 So. 610 (1924) (present
insanity). See also State v. Ashworth, 43 La. Ann. 204, 8 So. 625 (1891) ; State
v. Seiley, 41 La. Ann. 143 (1889) ; State v. Nelson, 32 La. Ann. 842 (1880). For
a discussion of the so-called "mixed questions of law and fact," see State v. Hayes,
162 La. 917, 111 So. 327 (1927).
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questions of fact which do not directly pertain to the guilt or
innocence of the accused," such facts are reviewable.9
If there is some evidence in support of a finding of fact relat-
ing to the guilt or innocence of the accused the Supreme Court
has said it cannot review.10 However, this rule is qualified in
that regardless of whether the initial finding was made by the
trial judge or by a jury," if there was no evidence at all to sup-
port an essential element of the crime charged, the Supreme
Court not only can 2 review but must'3 review the facts. The ra-
tionale employed here is that, if there is no evidence at all rela-
tive to an essential element of the crime charged, the question
8. See State v. Smith, 145 La. 913, 916, 83 So. 189, 190 (1919): "The argu-
ment [that this question is one of fact beyond the jurisdiction of this court]
rests upon the provision, in article 118 of the Constitution, that appeals from the
juvenile court shall be allowed upon matters of law only. That means merely that,
as in all criminal cases, we shall not have jurisdiction of a question of fact per-
taining to the question of guilt or innocence, or to the merits of the case. It does
not apply to a question of fact, upon which the trial'judge has based a ruling,
not pertaining to the question of guilt or innocence, or to the merits of the case."
Examples of issues which do not pertain to the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused are prescription, State v. Guillot, 200 La. 935, 9 So.2d 235 (1942), and
venue, State v. Paternostro, 224 La. 87, 68 So.2d 767 (1953).
9. The rule is stated that, although review in these matters is possible, it will
not be exercised adversely to the trial judge's ruling unless he is clearly wrong.
See, e.g., State v. Hilliard, 227 La. 208, 78 So.2d 835 (1955).
Even though the question presented is initially one for the judge, if he passes
the question to the jury, their finding is conclusive. State v. Paternostro, 224 La.
87, 68 So.2d 767 (1953) (venue). Of. State v. Guillot, 200 La. 935, 9 So.2d 235
(1942) (prescription).
10. See State v. Di Vincenti, 232 La. 13, 93 So.2d 676 (1957).
11. State v. Wilson, 196 La. 156, 198 So. 889 (1940).
12. State v. Amiss, 230 La. 1003, 89 So.2d 877 (1956) (court can only "ex-
amine" to see if there is any evidence) ; State v. Fitzgerald, 226 La. 801, 77 So.2d
400 (1954) (rule termed law well settled). An application of the rule resulted in
an annulment of the conviction in the following cases: State v. Daniels, 109 So.2d
896 (La. 1959) (intimidation of public officer not intended) ; State v. LaBorde,
234 La. 28, 99 So.2d 11 (1958) (no evidence that victim was unmarried) ; State
v. Sbisa, 232 La. 961, 95 So.2d 619 (1957) (no knowledge of graft system)
Mayerhafer v. Department of Police, 235 La. 437, 104 So.2d 163 (1958) (same)
State v. Harrell, 232 La. 35, 93 So.2d 684 (1957) (no evidence of criminal neg-
ligence) ; In re Glassberg, 230 La. 396, 88 So.2d 107 (1956) (accidental discharge
of gun) State v. La Nasa, 229 La. 842, 87 So.2d 1 (1956) (blue black ink not
shown not to be black ink, reversed on other grounds also) ; State v. Brown, 224
La. 480, 70 So.2d 96 (1954) (gambling not shown to be business) ; State v. Mc-
Lean, 216 La. 670, 44 So.2d 698 (1950) (worthless check not given for something
of value) ; State v. Wooderson, 213 La. 40, 34 So.2d 369 (1948) (no performance
of a lewd act) ; State v. Nomey, 204 La. 667, 16 So.2d 226 (1943) (no intent to
sell liquor) ; State v. Laborde, 202 La. 59, 11 So.2d 404 (1942) (no asportation) ;
State v. Lassiter, 198 La. 742, 4 So.2d 814 (1941) (trial judge presumed intent
to sell liquor) ; State v. Wilson, 196 La. 156, 198 So. 889 (1940) ; State v.
Morgan, 157 La. 962, 103 So. 278 (1925) (no corpus delicti); State v. Gani, 157
La. 231, 102 So. 318 (1924) (conviction as second offender) ; State v. Giangoeso,.
157 La. 360, 102 So. 429 (1924) (stolen things belonged to defendant) ; and State
v. Dunnington, 157 La. 369, 102 So. 478 (1924) (resisting an officer).
13. State v. McLean, 216 La. 670, 44 So.2d 698 (1950) ; State v. Wooderson,
213 La. 40, 34 So.2d 369 (1948); State v. Nomey, 204 La. 667, 16 So.2d 226
(1943) ; State v. Wilson, 196 La. 156, 198 So. 889 (1940).
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presented to the court on appeal becomes one of law within its
jurisdiction14 - "whether it be lawful to convict an accused with-
out any proof whatsoever as to his guilt."'15 This is as far as the
Supreme Court has gone in its statement of rules interpreting
the constitutional provision, for it has consistently held that the
sufficiency of the evidence or its credibility cannot be considered
on appeal.' 6 Neither can the court review the facts to ascertain
whether the defendant was afforded the protection of the reason-
able doubt rule' 7 nor to see if an inference of innocence is just
as reasonable from the evidence as an inference of guilt.'8
The origin of the Louisiana "no evidence" rule, as it will
hereinafter be called, is not clear. 19 In 192020 the no evidence rule
was stated by the court as presenting a reviewable issue of law,
but was found inapplicable in the case inasmuch as some evidence
had been produced. In State v. Giangosso21 in 1924 the facts as
certified by the trial judge showed that the defendant, convicted
of receiving stolen things, really owned the things. An applica-
tion of the no evidence rule in that case resulted in a remand.
From the apparent inception of the rule until the present there
has been no judicial expression indicating that the principle as
stated is contrary to the constitutional provision. But the de-
termination of whether there is some evidence or none has caused
vigorous disagreement among the Justices.22 An examination of
14. State v. Di Vincenti, 232 La. 13, 93 So.2d 676 (1957); State v. Montgom-
ery, 170 La. 203, 127 So. 601 (1930) ; State v. Wells, 147 La. 822, 86 So. 268
(1920).
15. State v. Nomey, 204 La. 667, 670, 16 So.2d 226, 227 (1943). See Justice
O'Niell's dissent in State v. McDonell, 208 La. 602, 23 So.2d 230 (1945). The
court was here divided not in relation to the statement of the rule, but rather as
to its application to the facts of the case.
16. See State v. Roberts, 224 La. 491, 70 So.2d 100 (1953) ; State v. Matassa,
222 La. 363, 62 So.2d 609 (1952) ; State v. Haddad, 221 La. 337, 59 So.2d 411
1(1951) ; State v. Sawyer, 220 La. 932, 57 So.2d 899 (1952) ; State v. Shelby, 215
La. 637, 41 So.2d 458 (1949) ; State v. Vallery, 214 La. 495, 38 So.2d 148 (1948) ;
State v. Cortez, 211 La. 669, 30 So.2d 681 (1947) ; State v. McDonell, 208 La.
602, 23 So.2d 230 (1945).
17. State v. Vallery, 214 La. 495, 38 So.2d 148 (1948) ; State v. Mattio, 212
La. 284, 31 So.2d 801 (1947) ; State v. Bell, 188 La. 322, 177 So. 63 (1937).
1 18. State v. Roberts, 224 La. 491, 70 So.2d 100 (1953) ; State v. Gaspard,
222 La. 222, 62 So.2d 281 (1952) (by implication in the case).
19. It was first urged in the case of State v. Diskin, 35 La. Ann. 46 (1883),
but the court avoided ruling on the possibility of review if the facts conformed to
the rule by stating that counsel was really urging an objection to the sufficiency
of the evidence.
20. State v. Wells, 147 La. 822, 86 So. 268 (1920).
21. 157 La. 360, 102 So. 429 (1924).
22. See the dissents saying there was no evidence in State v. Cortez, 211 La.
669, 30 So.2d 681 (1947) (point at issue was fact of possession) and State v.
.MeDonell, 208 La. 602, 23 So.2d 230 (1945) (time of breaking and entering at
issue). The case of State v. Gremillion, 160 La. 121, 106 So. 716 (1925) produced
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those cases where an application of the rule resulted in a reversal
may provide guidance for future cases.
Affirmative Showing of Impossibility
These cases fall into several general classes and the first
class, which encompasses the earlier cases, raises the question as
to whether the rule was correctly stated in its inception. Here
the court seems to have been impressed not so much with the
idea that there was no evidence relative to an essential element
of the crime charged, but rather that the evidence clearly showed
a state of facts completely inconsistent with that state of facts
necessary to prove the element in question.2 3 Examples are where
it was shown in a conviction for receiving stolen things that the
things really belonged to the accused ;24 where it was shown that
the defendant participated in a dice game merely as a player and
did not conduct the game as a business ;25 and where the defend-
ant's action did not constitute the performance of a lewd act in
the crime of obscenity as charged.2 6 Other cases in this line were
where it was shown that the defendant, charged with being a
second offender, had not been finally convicted for the first of-
fense ;27 where the record showed that the accused had cooper-
ated fully with the arresting officer although he had been con-
victed of resisting arrest ;28 and where the accidental discharge
of a gun precluded the general intent necessary for aggravated
battery.29 These cases reiterated the rule applied in no evidence
terminology rather than saying that there was an affirmative
showing of a state of facts inconsistent with the facts necessary
to a valid conviction. Phrasing the rule under the latter con-
vigorous dissents, but the true point at issue apparently involved a problem of
statutory interpretation.
The more recent cases have consistently contained dissents urging the existence
of some evidence. See State v. Daniels, 109 So.2d 896 (La. 1959) ; -State v. La
Borde, 234 La. 28, 99 So.2d 11 (1958) ; Mayerhafer v. Department of Police, 235
La. 437, 104 So.2d 163 (1958) ; State v. Sbisa, 232 La. 961, 95 So.2d 619 (1957);
State v. Harrell, 232 La. 35, 93 So.2d 684 (1957).
23. The rationale of State v. Wilson, 196 La. 156, 198 So. 889 (1940) is
especially pertinent here since there the court said that the evidence tended -to
prove affirmatively that the charged crime was not committed, but that it was
sufficient to say that there was no evidence relative to an essential element. The
crime charged was not specified in the opinion.
24. State v. Giangosso, 157 La. 360, 102 So. 429 (1924).
25. State v. Brown, 224 La. 480, 70 So.2d 96 (1954).
26. State v. Wooderson, 213 La. 40, 34 So.2d 369 (1948).
27. State v. Gani, 157 La. 231, 102 So. 318 (1924).
28. State v. Dunnington, 157 La. 369, 102 So. 478 (1924).
29. In re Glassberg, 230 La. 396, 88 So.2d 707 (1956) (delinquency proceed-
ing).
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struction certainly would not cover several of the recent cases
in this area, but it is submitted that such a statement would be
more consistent with the principle which apparently motivated
the court in the earlier cases. Deviations from the rule stated as
suggested above have produced vigorous dissents urging a re-
versal of the conviction."0
A second class of cases applying the rule of no evidence seems
actually .to involve problems of statutory interpretation wherein
the trial court erroneously failed to interpret the charged crime
as requiring an element which the evidence affirmatively showed
did not exist. In such cases, then, the district attorney was seek-
ing a conviction for conduct not proscribed by the crime charged,
as where asportation was found on appeal to be a necessary
element in the crime of cattle stealing ;81 where there had to be
an exchange for something of value and not merely a pre-existing
debt in a case involving the issuance of a worthless check ;32 and
where the court found that blue-black ink sufficiently met the
statutory requirement of using black ink in a death certificate.88
It should be noted that this class of cases, unlike the first class,
still leaves the matter of determining reviewability in advance
much to the conjecture of counsel, inasmuch as it is dependent
upon the interpretation which the Supreme Court will place on
the crime charged.
Failure of Proof
A third set of cases in this area involve prosecutions where
an element of the crime cannot be proved by direct evidence, but
can only be adduced by inference from the circumstances. In
State v. Sbisa34 the court reversed a conviction for misfeasance
in office upon a finding that the officer had no knowledge of the
'30. State v. Cortez, 211 La. 669, 30 So.2d 681 (1947). In a conviction for
possession of narcotics, the dissent urged that the evidence showed that the de-
fendant had no possession. In State v. McDonell, 208 La. 602, 23 So.2d 230
(1945), the accused was convicted of breaking and entering in the night time.
Although the prosecution's witness said the crime occurred after dark, she con-
sistently set the time as being 'between six and seven in the evening. A letter from
the local meteorologist stated that sunset had occurred on the day of the crime at
8:04 in the evening. Here again the dissent urged that there was no evidence that
the crime had occurred in the night time. State v. Gremillion, 160 La. 121, 106
So. 716 (1925) may fall into this set of cases also, although there the problem
causing the split of the court seemed to be more one of statutory interpretation.
31. State v. Laborde, 202 La. 59, 11 So.2d 404 (1942).
32. State v. McLean, 216 La. 670, 44 So.2d 698 (1950).
33 State v. La Nasa, 229 La. 842, 87 So.2d 1 (1956), reversed on other
grounds: also.
34. 232 La. 961, 95 So.2d 619 (1957).
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operation of a graft system which the evidence conclusively
showed existed in his precinct. Sbisa was followed by the case of
Mayerhafer v. Department of Police,8 5 which employed the same
rationale. Reversing a conviction of negligent homicide where
the accused speeded up his car to get by when he detected the
deceased pedestrian about to cross the road, the court in State v.
Harrell6 said that the defendant's action may have been "a poor
choice of action" or "an error of judgment" but it did not consti-
tute criminal negligence. On first hearing in the case of State
v. Daniels8 7 the court reversed a conviction of public intimida-
tion where the evidence showed that the accused, a convict in the
state penitentiary, swung at and hit a guard of that institution.
It was held that there was no evidence showing that the defend-
ant by his action intended to influence the conduct of the guard.
In all these cases dissents were registered urging that the issue
was one of fact on which some evidence was apparent. It does
appear that in these cases there was "some" evidence on the
issue, and the rulings of the court appears to approach, if not
reach, the point of ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence.
Apparently there are only three cases in which the court was
squarely presented with a problem of no evidence relative to an
essential element. Two cases involved convictions for possessing
liquor with the intent to sell it.88 Both seem to present a situa-
tion where the trial court worked from an approach of assuming
the intent to sell from the mere fact of possession. In one of
these cases, the trial judge expressly admitted that he had "pre-
sumed" this factor.3 9 In the third case 40 the district attorney
admitted that there was no evidence tending to show the crime
except the confession of the accused. Holding that the corpus
delicti could not be established by a confession alone, the court
said that by the district attorney's admission there was no other
evidence on this essential element, and remanded the case.
The recent case of State v. La Borde4' is most difficult of clas-
sification even under the very general designation established
35. 235 La. 437, 104 So.2d 163 (1958).
36. 232 La. 35, 93 So.2d 684 (1957).
37. 109 So.2d 896 (La. 1959).
38. State v. Nomey, 204 La. 667, 16 So.2d 226 (1943) termed a borderline case
in State v. Daniels, 109 So.2d 896 (La. 1959) (dissent) and State v. Lassiter,
198 La. 742, 4 So.2d 814 (1941).
39. In State v. Lassiter, 198 La. 742, 4 So.2d 814 (1941), explained in State
v. Valentine, 203 La. 1057, 14 So.2d 851 (1943).
40. State v. Morgan, 157 La. 962, 103 So. 278 (1925).
41. 234 La. 28, 99 So.2d 11 (1958).
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above and thus it may indicate a new consideration in the no
evidence rule. In this case the court reversed on the grounds that
there was no evidence that the victim of the carnal knowledge
was unmarried at the time of the crime. The evidence did show
that the girl, only fourteen years old, was in school, living with
her parents, and had received several offers of marriage from
the defendant in the interim between the commission of the
crime and the filing of the indictment. A dissent was raised on
the grounds that only a question of fact was at issue upon which
some evidence had been adduced. It appears that the majority
was moved by the relative ease with which the state could have
proved the fact at issue, and felt that it should not be entitled
to rely on circumstantial evidence when one question placed to
the girl while she was on the stand would have afforded direct
evidence of the best sort. The writer of the majority opinion in
La Borde has subsequently indicated that this was the line of
reasoning applied there.42
From the above cases certain generalizations may be deduced
which perhaps will assist counsel attempting to present a prob-
lem under the no evidence rule to the Supreme Court. It should
be clear that where the evidence affirmatively shows that an es-
sential element of the charged crime could not have occurred,
then the accused is entitled to a reversal.43 Where, however, the
statute is vague or unclear and general in its specification of the
crime, this affirmative proof of impossibility may have to await
elucidation as to the required elements by the Supreme Court
before the proof and the element can be compared. 44 Where, as
in most of the cases in the third class discussed above, 45 the ele-
ment at issue is a subjective matter of intent or knowledge, 46 the
court appears prone to find that slight evidence is no evidence.
42. Justice McCaleb, dissenting in State v. Daniels, 109 So.2d 896 (La. 1959)
(on first hearing).
43. See cases cited at notes 22-28 supra. The same result should follow where
the judge presumes an element, State v. Lassiter, 198 La. 742, 4 So.2d 814 (1941),
or the district attorney admits he has no legally acceptable evidence, State v.
Morgan, 157 La. 962, 103 So. 278 (1925).
44. See cases cited at notes 30-32 supra.
45. See the cases cited at notes 33, 34, 36 supra.
46. Compare with the cases cited notes 34, 35, 37 supra the case of State v.
Almerico, 232 La. 847, 95 So.2d 334 (1957) and State v. Sawyer, 220 La. 932,
57 So.2d 899 (1952) relative to the inference to be drawn from the circumstances.
It is to be noted that the cases cited notes 33, 34, and 36 supra all involve
problems of intent where as the Almerico and Sawyer cases supra involved issues
other than intent. Query: will the court require a "probabilities" test in matters
of intent, while accepting a "possibility" test on other elements of the crime
charged?
[Vol. XlX
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The reason for this may be due to the court's general abhor-
rence47 of presuming an intent from the mere facts of a situation
in the absence of a clear inference from those facts that this was
what the defendant intended or knew. Where the point at issue
is capable of direct proof, La Borde48 indicates that nothing less
will do regardless of the inferential weight of the circumstances.
Some cases in articulating the no evidence rule have used the
words "legal"4 9 or "probative" 50 evidence. It would seem that if
the only evidence in support of an essential element were legally
inadmissible evidence, the exclusion of that evidence on appeal
would make the no evidence rule applicable. 51 Thus the rule
might well be stated "no legal evidence on an essential element
will afford grounds for reversal." However, if the word "proba-
tive" is added, that seems clearly to relate to sufficiency and
would cause the rule to be stated in terms offensive to the con-
stitutional provision.52 It must be noted, however, that the recent
cases tend to move to this interpretation, in effect.
53
Perfecting the Motion
Granted defendant has a valid case of no evidence, it is still
necessary for him to perfect his appeal on it. 54 The proper
method for raising the objection is on motion for new trial.5 If
47. On this matter of presumptions, see State v. Lassiter, 198 La. 742, 4 So.2d
814 (1941).
48. State v. LaBorde, 234 La. 28, 99 So.2d 11 (1958).
49. See State v. Roberts, 224 La. 491, 70 So.2d 100 (1954) and State v. Davis,
208 La. 954, 23 So.2d 801 (1945).
50. See Mayerhafer v. Department of Police, 235 La. 437, 104 So.2d 163
(1958) (no probative evidence) and State v. LaBorde, 234 La. 28, 99 So.2d 11
(1958) (no evidence of probative value). Note that Justice McCaleb who objected
to the majority's use of the term probative in his dissent in the Mayerhafer case
supra seems to have employed essentially the same terminology in his majority
opinion in LaBorde supra.
51. State v. Davis, 208 La. 954, 23 So.2d 801 (1945), uses the expression
"legally admitted evidence." See State v. Brown, 108 So.2d 233 (La. 1959) (con-
fession as establishing the corpus delicti) and State v. Morgan, 157 La. 962, 103
So. 278 (1925) (same).
52. However, the case of Mayerhafer v. Department of Police, 235 La. 437,
104 So.2d 163 (1958), in which the ruling was predicated on the court's decision
in State v. Sbisa, 232 La. 961, 95 So.2d 619 (1957) uses the term "probative" in
this manner. See the dissent in Mayerhafer supra on this point, but compare the
same Justice's language in State v. LaBorde, 234 La. 28, 99 So.2d 11 (1958).
All three cases seem to involve a situation where the court did go to the sufficiency
of the evidence.
53. See the cases cited note 52 supra.
54. Failure to bring up the record and other essentials will naturally preclude
the court's consideration of the motion. See State v. Gaspard, 222 La. 222, 62
So.2d 281 (1952).
55. State v. Sawyer, 220 La. 932, 57 So.2d 899 (1952) says that this is the
proper method to raise the issue. Such a procedure properly raises the issue as a
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the trial judge overrules that motion, there is a question of law
presented for the Supreme Court if there is in truth no evidence
relative to an essential element. Counsel should be specific and
ground his motion for a new trial on the clear allegation that
there is no evidence relative to an essential element so that it is
clear that his objection is not one going to the sufficiency of the
evidence. 56 It has been said that, in support of such a motion, on
appeal the entire transcript or record should be brought up.
5 7
This should be true only where the problem is properly one of no
evidence or grossly insufficient evidence5" (as in those cases in
class three and the case of La Borde). If the situation is one
where the facts affirmatively show that an essential element
could not have occurred (as in those cases in classes one and two)
then it should suffice if only so much of the trial proceedings are
brought up as clearly show this.5 9 As a precaution, however,
counsel should bring up the entire transcript 0 so that regardless
of the exact nature of the no evidence problem, the court will be
able to consider it.
question of law in compliance with LA. R.S. 15:516 (1950) (jurisdiction of Su-
preme Court to review trial court's rulings on motions for new trial limited to
errors of law). See State v. Reilly, 37 La. Ann. 5 (1885) (counsel must make the
question one of law) and State v. Taylor, 37 La. Ann. 40 (1885) (where counsel
appears to have raised a no evidence objection improperly). But cf. State v.
Nomey, 204 La. 667, 16 So.2d 226 (1943) (where writs were employed) ; State
v. Lassiter, 198 La. 742, 4 So.2d 814 (1941) (same).
56. See State v. Vallery, 214 La. 495, 38 So.2d 148 (1948) ; State v. Calloway,
213 La. 129, 34 So.2d 399 (1948). But cf. State v. Saia, 212 La. 868, 33 So.2d
665 (1947). In State v. D'Ingianni, 217 La. 945, 47 So.2d 731 (1950) counsel
moved for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was contrary to the law and
evidence; his amended motion still questioned the sufficiency of the evidence, but
the court "examined" the evidence from a no evidence standpoint, although it said
that because of the procedure employed it did not have to.
It. would seem that if counsel, however he phrases his motion, makes it clear
that his argument goes to a lack of any evidence rather than the sufficiency of
the evidence, the court will consider the issue, and review.
57. See State v. Sawyer, 220 La. 932, 57 So.2d 899 (1952) ; State v. D'Ingianni,
217 La. 945, 47 So.2d 731 (1950).
58. This was done in State v. Nomey, 204 La. 667, 16 So.2d 226 (1943). Of
course if it is admitted by the trial judge or the district attorney that an essential
element was not proved, then such admission should be sufficient to predicate a
reversal. State v. Lassiter, 198 La. 742, 4 So.2d 814 (1941) (judge "presumed"
the essential clement) ; State v. Laborde, 202 La. 59. 11 So.2d 404 (1942). See
also State v. Morgan, 157 La. 762, 103 So. 278 (1925) (admission by district at-
torney). The facts were stipulated in State v. Gremillion, 160 La. 121, 106 So. 716
(1926).
59. See State v. Giangosso, 157 La. 360, 102 So. 429 (1924) (trial judge cer-
tified statement of facts in bill). See State v. Bernard, 204 La. 844, 16 So.2d
454 (1943), where the statement of facts was stipulated and held properly re-
viewable on no evidence grounds.
60. The transcript should be incorporated in a bill of exceptions taken to the
trial judge's refusal to grant a new trial. See State v. Brown, 108 So.2d 233
(La. 1959).
1959] COMMENTS
Disposition of Case Where No Evidence Is Found
Although defendant's motion is for a new trial, the recent
cases seem fully committed to disposing of the case by discharg-
ing the defendant if it is found that the motion is well taken.,"
This practice has been dissented from, 62 and strongly criticized
by two Justices who nevertheless feel bound to follow it.68 One
Justice has suggested that a new plea "a demurrer to the evi-
dence" be employed in these cases so that the pleadings and the
dispositions will accord.64 It is submitted that the determina-
tion of whether to discharge or grant a new trial as requested
should be determined according to the circumstances: discharg-
ing where there is an affirmative showing of impossibility and
remanding for a new trial where there is merely a failure of
proof.6 5 The court's present position also presents the problem of
whether in sustaining the defendant's motion for new trial on
no evidence grounds the trial judge can discharge the defend-
ant.68 A more serious problem is whether the discharge granted
by the Supreme Court in these cases suffices to make operative
the rule of double jeopardy.67 The seriousness with which this
non-responsive disposition of the case has been discussed implies
that the judges do not consider it merely a matter of terminology
whether the defendant is given a new trial or discharged. If the
discharge is to operate as an acquittal, then it is submitted that
the no evidence cases must be clearly distinguished to separate
61. See State v. Daniels, 109 So.2d 896 (La. 1959) ; State v. LaBorde, 234
La. 28, 99 So.2d 11 (1958) ; State v. Sbisa, 232 La. 961, 95 So.2d 619 (1957);
State v. Harrell, 232 La. 35, 93 So.2d 684 (1957).
62. In all the cases cited in note 61 supra, there were dissents.
63. Justices McCaleb and Hawthorne. See the decision and dissent in State
v. LaBorde, 234 La. 28, 99 So.2d 11 (1958).
64. Justice McCaleb in his dissent in State v. Sbisa, 232 La. 961, 95 So.2d 619
(1957).
65. The older cases are not consistent with this proposition either: State v.
Brown, 224 La. 480, 70 So.2d 96 (1954) (affirmative showing- discharge);
State v. McLean, 216 La. 670, 44 So:2d 698 (1950) (affirmative showing -new
trial) ; State v. Wooderson, 213 La. 40, 34 So.2d 369 (1948) (affirmative show-
ing-new trial) ; State v. Nomey, 204 La. 667, 16 So.2d 226 (1943) (failure of
proof -discharge) ; State v. Laborde, 202 La. 59, 11 So.2d 404 (1942) (affirma-
tive showing -discharge); State v. Lassiter, 198 La. 742, 4 So.2d 814 (1941)
(failure of proof-discharged) ; State v. Wilson, 196 La. 156, 198 So. 889 (1940)
(affirmative showing -new trial); State v. Morgan, 157 La. 962, 103 So. 278
(1925) (failure of proof - new trial) ; State v. Giangosso, 157 La. 360, 102 So.
429 (1924) (affirmative showing - new trial) ; State v. Dunnington, 157 La.
369, 102 So. 478 (1924) (affirmative showing -new trial).
66. This question is posed in State v. LaBorde, 234 La. 28, n. 2, 99 So.2d 11,
n. 2 (1958).
67. Ibid. Justice McCaleb refers to the paradox that an accused complaining
of the overruling of a motion for a new trial may secure a "complete acquittal and
discharge" of the crime.
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situations of affirmative impossibility from situations involving
a mere failure of proof, and a discharge should be granted only
in the former situation.
Joseph G. Hebert
